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Abstract 
In this paper we provide models for characterizing the equilibrium swap 
rates for two types of interest rate swaps. The first is a fixed rate for 
floating rate swap between a risky firm and a riskless institution. The 
second is a swap between two risky firms with an intermediary guaranteeing the 
performance. This swap is modeled as a cooperative game between the players 
in the context of competitive intermediary services. In specific, we deter-
mine the payoff space and invoke the Nash Bargaining solution for charac-
terizing the equilibrium swap rates. In addition to being descriptive of the 
prevailing swap rates, our models can be used by intermediaries and firms to 
determine equilibrium swap rates. 
I. Introduction 
For more than a decade swa~s have been a popular financial tool available 
to corporations seeking to alter their interest and/or exchange rate exposure. 
With the growing popularity of swaps, the swap market has evolved not only in 
terms of the availability of different types of swap instruments but also in 
terms of the institutional arrangements for entering into swap contracts. 
When swaps were initially introduced, swap contracts were directly negotiated 
by the two counterparties. Subsequently, intermediaries began to play a 
significant role in swap contracts. In many instances, the intermediary, in 
addition to bringing the two counterparties together, would also guarantee the 
performance of the counterparties to each other. Either party to the contract 
could then behave as if it were dealing with a riskless counterparty. The 
intermediaries were compensated for their services of providing the informa-
tion to bring the two counterparties together and the guarantee of performance 
of the counterparties in terms of the spreads they received. Recently, 
however, due to increased competition among intermediaries, the spreads have 
been narrowing.! 
In this paper we provide models for characterizing equilibrium rates for 
two types of interest rate swaps. The first is a fixed for floating rate swap 
between a risky firm and a riskless intermediary. The second is a fixed for 
floating rate swap between two risky firms through a riskless intermediary. 
The interest rate swap market has grown significantly since its beginning in 
the early 80's and the total outstanding volume now exceeds a trillion 
dollars. The pricing of the interest-rate swap contracts or in other words 
the setting of the fixed and floating rates that the counterparties pay each 
other either directly or through an intermediary are influenced by many fac-
tors. The factors include the prevailing rates in the financial markets, the 
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creditworthiness of counterparties and the institutional arrangements 
underlying the contract. 
The analysis of the pricing of interest-rate swaps has attracted attention 
of many financial economists in the past. Bicksler and Chen (1986) developed 
an approach to price interest rate swaps in a stochastic interest rate 
environment. They considered a context where two default risk free counter-
parties contracied with each other directly. In a recent paper, Cooper and 
Mello (1991) explicitly accounted for the default risk in pricing of swaps. 
In their scenario, the payor of floating rate is riskless while the payor of 
fixed rate is risky. Using the option pricing approach, they are able to 
characterize the solution to the problem of pricing interest rate swaps in the 
presence of default risk. 
In this paper we characterize equilibrium swap rates when both the coun-
terparties are risky. We also explicitly incorporate the intermediary in our 
-
analysis. In particular, the intermediary operating in a competitive market 
for services of intermediation provides a guarantee for the performance of the 
counterparties to each other. Most swap transactions are carried out on a 
give-up name basis. The counterparties to a swap can therefore find credit 
and other information about each other. Also, the process of arriving at the 
swap rates can involve more than one round of negotiations. The two counter-
parties may not always directly negotiate with each other but may deal with 
each other only through an intermediary. In both cases, however, they are 
dealing with a nearly "full information• situation. In this situation, the 
final outcome depends on the mutual interaction among the firms interested in 
a swap and the intermediary institution; each of whom can be assumed to be in 
pursuit of its own self-interest. 
Given this strategic interdependence, we have chosen to model this 
situation using a game theoretic approach. Our game theoretic solution to the 
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swap problem provides the optimal swap rates that the two counterparties 
acting in their own self interest will agree upon. It is not our claim that 
the actual process of pricing swap transactions is played out as a bargaining 
game. We do. however. believe that the agreed swap rates will be as if they 
were an outcome of the bargaining game. Given our assumptions. if the actual 
rates did not conform to the game theoretic solution at least one of the coun-
terparties would not agree to transact. It is in this sense that we believe 
our model to be descriptive of the observed swap rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the 
details of the economic setting we consider. Section III details the Nash 
bargaining game and characterizes its solution. Section IV concludes the 
paper. 
II. The Economic Scenario 
In this section we set out in detail the essential features of the econom-
ic context we analyze in this paper. We begin by describing the capital 
market context in which the players in the game operate. We then describe the 
role of the intermediary in the capital markets. We also provide the details 
of the possible actions available to each player and outline their payoffs and 
objective functions. 
A. The Capital Market Context 
There exist capital markets where all firms in the economy can raise both 
fixed rate and floating rate funds. In the capital markets considered here 
all floating rates on funds borrowed will be indexed to the same "base" float-
ing or stochastic rate. R. where -denotes a random variable. In other words. 
for all firms. floating rates are quoted as R + spread, where the spread is 
determined at the time the debt/swap contract is entered into and remains 
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constant through the life of the contract. While this feature of the economic 
context we consider does limit some flexibility, it allows us to minimize ana-
lytical complexity to a great extent.2 In practical terms this assumption 
means that if for a particular firm, floating rate is priced off say LIBOR 
then the floating rates for all other firms will also be priced off LIBOR. In 
other words, the rates on all floating rate debts will be perfectly correlated. 
Within the context of such capital markets we will focus attention on two 
firms whom we will call firm A and firm B. We will consider a situation where 
firm A currently has fixed rate debt outstanding and firm B has floating rate 
debt outstanding. At this time, however, firm A prefers to have a floating 
rate liability and firm B prefers to have a fixed rate liability. It is not 
the purpose of our paper to delve into the reasons why firm A might desire 
floating rate funds or firm B might desire fixed rate funds. We take as given 
the fact that these firms have their respective preferences. Our goal is to 
model the rates they would pay each other in case they do decide to enter into 
a swap contract. 
Since firm A desires floating rate funds and firm B desires fixed rate 
funds, both of them could potentially obtain their desired type of funds in 
the capital markets and retire their existing liabilities.3 If they do, 
there would be no necessity for a swap. Our analysis, however, allows for the 
possibility that the prevailing structure of rates available to both firms 
across floating and fixed _rate markets may be such that firm A may find it 
advantageous not to directly issue floating rate debt in the capital market 
and retire its existing fixed rate liability but keep the existing liability 
and swap it for floating rate debt. In the scenario we are considering a swap 
will be feasible between firm A and firm B only if firm B also finds it 
advantageous not to directly issue fixed rate debt in the capital market and 
retire its existing liability but keep it and swap it for fixed rate debt. 
s 
In relation to the possible structures of prevailing rates in the capital 
markets that we allow for, two issues need to be noted. First, we do not 
attempt to analyze or explain why such structures of rates might exist in the 
capital markets. We also do not enter the debate as to whether such a struc-
ture of rates may arise due to existence of arbitrage opportunities as postu-
lated by Bicksler and Chen (1986) or due to market incompleteness as postu-
lated by Smith, Smithson and Wakeman (1988). Whatever may be the reason 
underlying the existence such structure of rates, the purpose of our paper is 
to provide insight into the process of rate negotiation in a swap if the 
structure of rates makes one feasible and attractive. 
Second, we assume that firm A has comparative advantage in fixed rate mar-
ket whereas firm B has comparative advantage in the floating rate market. As 
an illustration of such comparative advantage, consider the rates shown in 
Table 1. These rates indicate that in the fixed rate market firm A can raise 
funds at a rate 120 basis points lower than that available to firm B. On the 
other hand, firm A can raise funds in the floating rate market at a rate only 
SO basis points lower than that available to firm B. In this case, firm A has 
a comparative advantage in the fixed rate market and firm B in the floating 
rate market. In the rest of the paper we will focus on situations where there 
exists such a comparative advantage. 
Insert Table 1 here 
B. Role of the Third Party 
There exist institutions in the capital markets who participate in swap 
activities. The participation of these institutions in swap activities can be 
of two types. One, they could use their knowledge of the firms in the market 
to bring firms A and B together where both firms could contract with each 
other and the institution (Z) will stand as a guarantor of the performance of 
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both counterparties in the swap transaction. The service provided by Z there-
fore entails a riskless guarantee to each counterparty to the swap transac-
tion. In this case we will call Z to be functioning as an intermediary. 
Alternatively, Z could participate in the swap transaction by entering into 
the swap by itself. In this case Z is in fact a counterparty. Here too we 
assume that payments from Z to A are riskless. Note that this feature of our 
analysis is the same as the one considered by Cooper and Mello (1991). In 
case of both these types of participation by Z in swap transactions, the swap 
payments received by both firm A and B are riskless. 
The intermediary charges a fee proportional to the amount of swap transac-
tion. The market for institutional services is assumed to be competitive. 
This assumption ensures that all intermediaries would charge the same fee. 
The intermediary collects his fee from the net cash flow that passes through 
him between the two counterparties. Since the payments made by the counter-
parties are risky, the cash flow received by the intermediary in the form of 
his fee is also risky. In the context of our model, therefore, this assump-
tion implies that in any swap transaction the payoffs to Z must have an exoge-
nously fixed net present value. The other implication of this assumption is 
that both firm A and firm B have a wide choice of institutions. Thus, if one 
institution offers to bring A and B together and provide a performance guaran-
tee and another institution offers to enter into the swap on its own account, 
both firms will choose the better of the two offers. 
C. Actions and Contractual Payments 
Given the capital market context and the availability of institutional 
services described in subsections A and B above, we will provide here the 
details of the actions available to firms A and B and the associated 
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contractual payments. Table 2 provides the actions available to and the con-
sequent contractual payments required of both firms A and B. 
Insert Table 2 here 
In the Table 2: 
F~ denotes the payment required to be made by firm A on fixed rate debt 
raised in the market. 
denotes the fixed rate payment required to be made by A when a swap 
is entered into with Z as a counterparty. 
F~ denotes the fixed rate payment required to be made by A when a swap 
is entered into with Z as an intermediary. 
Y! denotes the floating rate payment required to be made by A to the 
investors in the market. 
~ denotes the floating rate payment required to be made by A when a 
swap is entered into with Z as a counterparty. 
~ denotes the floating rate payment required to be made by A when a 
swap is entered with Z as an intermediary. 
&! denotes the spread over R that A agrees to pay when it contracts to 
pay Y!. 
A A Analogous definitions hold for &z and &s. Also, analogous definitions hold 
for firm B. Without loss of generality, we assume firm A to be more 
creditworthy than firm B. This implies: 
A F~ ~ < J j • m, Z or S 
(1) and 
-A ~ < -B Yj j • m, Z or S 
alternatively, 
A &~ ~ < J j • m, Z or S. 
The maturity of the debt and swap contracts considered here is one period. 
A B This implies that Fj, Fj, 
principal and interest. 
~A -B Yj- and Yj are terminal payouts consisting of both 
We assume that both firms A and B will seek to maximize the values of 
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their respective shareholders' wealth. The value of shareholders' equity is, 
however, equal to the value of a call option on the firm value with the exer-
cise price of the call being the payment to debt holders or the gross payment 
to swap counterparties. The values of shareholders' wealth as a consequence 
of each of the six actions listed in Table 2 for both firms A and B are · given 
by: 
Wx(F~) • C(Vx, F~) j • m, Z or S and K • A or B 
(2) and 
where 
Wx(Y~) • c(vx, ~> j • m, Z, or S and K • A or B. 
denotes the value of the shareholders' wealth for firm K when it 
K 
contracts to make payment Fj. 
denotes the value of the shareholders' wealth of firm K when it 
-K contracts to make payment Yj. 
Vx denotes the value of the firm K. 
- K C(Vx,Fj) denotes the value of a call option on firm value Vx with the 
exercise price FJ. 
C(Vx,~) denotes the value of a call option on firm value Vx with a 
stochastic exercise price YJ. 
The institution Z on its own part simply tries to ensure that the present value 
of all the cash flows received by itself is equal to the fixed fee it receives 
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as described earlier. This follows directly from the assumption of perfect 
competition in the market for institutional services. 
In the next section we provide the formal model of the swap process. 
III. Swap Bargaining Games 
As discussed in subsection A of section II above, firm A has fixed rate 
debt outstanding but desires to have a floating rate liability while firm B 
has floating rate debt outstanding but desires to have a fixed rate liability. 
The firms then have a choice of either swapping with Z as counterparty, or 
swapping with each other with Z as intermediary or not swapping at all. There 
are three swaps possible in this situation: Firm A could swap with Z, firm B 
could swap with Z, and both firms could swap with each other through Z. Firm 
B's swap with Z has been analyzed by Cooper and Mello (1991). We analyze the 
remaining two. In the rest of this section we provide formal models of both 
these swaps. 
A. Firm A's Swap with Z 
In this case, firm A has issued fixed rate debt in the market and has 
A A agreed to pay Fm· A will then swap with z. Z pays firm A riskless amount Fm• 
Firm A, in return, will agree to pay Z a floating rate ~ • R+ &~. Our 
A problem is to determine a fair &z. The payoffs to both parties.A and Z are 
given in Table 3. Following Cooper and Mellow (1991), we assume that the swap 
contract is a contract for the net cash flows due in the swap, and not for an 
exchange of gross amounts. Swaps are also assumed to be subordinate to debt 
in bankruptcy. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Insert Figure 1 here 
B~ are the cash flows to the bondholders of A if it issued fixed rate 
debt at rate F~ and swapped it with Z for floating rate debt at rate ~. E~ 
are the cash flows to equity holders of A in the same scenario. Z~ are the 
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cash flows to Z. CM(VA,~, F~) is the value of the call option on the minimum 
d -A i i . FA of VA an Yz w th exerc se pr1ce m· -A A P(Yz,Fm) is the value of the put option 
on ~ with exercise price F~. Payoffs to Z are the same as those to a port-
folio CM(VA,~,F~)- P(~,F:!>, i.e., buy a call on the minimum of VA andY~ 
with exercise price F! and write a put on ~ with exercise price Fm· Given 
perfect competition in the market for institutional services Z will set 
Y~ • R + &~, such that4 
(3) CM(VA,~,F!> - P(~,F!) • P • Value of Z~ • Fixed fee. 
As discussed before equation (3) just restates the implication of perfect 
competition in the market for institutional services. Let ~ (or &~) be the 
A solution to (3) and denote by BF the payoff to debt holders of firm A before 
the swap. The following Lemma then shows that the debt holders of firm A will 
be better off after the swap. 
Lemma 1: Value of B~ > Value of B~ 
Proof: From the table above notice that the payoffs in B~ are identical to 
those in B~ except in state three where the payoffs are: 
Hence, Value of B~ > Value of B~. 
Since the total value of the firm remains constant, Lemma 1 above must 
imply that shareholders lose the value that is gained by the debt holders. In 
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other words, there is wealth transfer from shareholders to debt holders. 
Proposition I below formalizes this intuition. 
Proposition I: 
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 1 and the discussion above. 
It is clear that a swap entails a loss in wealth to the shareholders. The 
incentive of the shareholders to enter into a swap then lies in the fact that 
they desire floating rate funds. Presumably in some other aspect of the 
firm's operations there are benefits to be derived from floating rate funds. 
These are the benefits that give rise to the desire for floating rate funds in 
the first place. Firm A, therefore, would enter into a swap transaction if 
the benefits to be derived from having floating rate funds are greater than 
the loss to shareholder wealth from the swap transaction. 
B. Swap Between A and B through Z 
We now turn our attention to the case where both firms A and B could 
engage into an interest rate swap arrangement. In this case the firm A has 
issued fixed rate debt while it desires floating rate funds. The firm B, on 
the other hand, has issued floating rate debt while its real desire is to 
obtain fixed rate funds. The firms A and B, therefore, could arrange an 
interest rate swap with each other through Z as the intermediary. 
Such a swap arrangement will become a reality only if all the parties 
involved are satisfied with the details of the contractual arrangement. In 
specific, the following conditions must be true: 
(1) the firms A and Bare agreeable to the swap rates, i.e., the floating rate 
that the firm A pays, and the fixed rate that the firm B pays; 
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(2) the intermediary Z is adequately compensated for the services it provides, 
in bringing together the right parties and in providing the guarantee for 
payment of interest from one party to another. 
If in case the above conditions are not met, the firms A and B may still be 
interested in swap arrangements. But then they will have to consider two sep-
arate swaps with Z as the counterparty. Thus, firm A may enter into a swap 
arrangement with Z which is distinct and independent of the swap arrangement 
that firm B may reach with Z. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
The above description evidently deals with a situation of strategic inter-
dependence in which the outcome depends on the mutual interaction between 
rational players; each of whom pursuing its own interests. This is clearly a 
situation where the game theoretic approach is appropriate and beneficial.s 
Moreover, since the swaps are brokered on a "give-up" name basis the situation 
clearly allows for communication between parties and involves full information 
bargaining between parties to reach suitable binding arrangements. Hence, in 
this subsection, we formulate a . cooperative game model to the interest rate 
swap. In specific, we propose two-person bargaining game between firms A and 
B, where the role of intermediary Z is captured in terms of the conditions it 
imposes on the swap rates. 
As we discussed in subsection B above, the market for intermediary ser-
vices is competitive. This competition ensures that the NPV of the cash flows 
to Z is equal to the fixed fee ~. Figure 2 shows the cash flows that z 
encounters. Notice that the NPV of cash flows related to A is represented by 
the L.H.S. of equation (3) above. Similarly, the NPV of cash flows related to 
B is captured by the L.H.S. of the analogous equation developed by Cooper and 
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Mello (1991) and restated in equation 3A in footnote 4. Thus, the NPV of Z's 
cash flows with both A and B is obtained by summing the L.H.S. 's of 3 and 3A. 
That is: 
where: 
-B B Fs is the value of a default risk free claim on Fg, and 
-A -A Ys is the value of a default risk free claim on Ys 
- -A B - ~_A PX(VB• Yg, Fg) is the value of a put option on the maximum of VB and Ts 
B 
with exercise price equal to Fs. 
is the NPV of the fee Z charges for the swap. 
The above equation has two unknowns, viz. F~ and ~. and defines a relation 
between them. Obviously, if one rate decreases the other must increase to 
ensure that equation (4) holds, i.e., NPV is equal toP. Equation (4) in fact 
defines the set of feasible swap rates as depicted by curve SS in Figure 3. 
In the appendix we provide conditions necessary for curve SS to be convex. 
It is interesting to note that one specific pair of swap rates on curve SS, 
denoted by point Q will also simultaneously satisfy the conditions imposed by 
equation (3) and (3A) in footnote 4. All points on SS other than Q do satisfy 
equation (4) but not (3) and (3A). In equation (4) the NPV shortfall caused 
by lowering one rate is compensated by excess due to increasing the other 
rate. Since Z is indifferent between all points on the curve SS, it defines 
the feasible set of swap rates for A and B to negotiate upon. The process of 
negotiation that leads to the specific pair of swap rates acceptable to both A 
and B is modeled below. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
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Prior to the stage where the bargaining game is played, firms A and B have 
identified the ideal way of raising funds in the capital market using the 
process described in subsection A. Thus, the shareholder wealth positions of 
firms when they begin the game are: A -B WA(Fm) for firm A and WB(Ym) for firm B. 
A -B The initial shareholder wealth levels WA(Fm) and WB(Ym) are represented by 
point 0 in Figure 4. Note that point 0 is on the inside of the straight line 
representing the aggregate firm value (VA+VB). The difference between the 
aggregate firm value and the sum of the shareholder wealth levels WA<F!> + 
-B WB(Ym) represented at point 0 is the sum wealths of bondholders of firms A and 
those of firm B. To clarify the relation between curve nn and point 0 let us 
refer back to curve SS in Figure 3. As we discussed earlier, each point on 
curve SS represents a pair of feasible swap rates (~, F~). Corresponding to 
~_A B _A ~_A B -B each such pair exist shareholder wealth levels WA(Tg,Fg,FJii) and WB(Tg,Fg,Ym>· 
Each point on curve nn in Figure 4 therefore represents shareholder wealth 
levels corresponding to a pair of feasible swap rates. Curve nn is hence 
labeled the Payoff Space. It is clear that the sum (WA + WB), where we have 
suppressed the arguments of WA and WB for expositional convenience, corre-
spending to any point on curve nn is less than the sum of the shareholder 
wealths represented by point 0. The aggregate shareholder wealth therefore 
declines after the swap. This is a consequence of Lemma 1 and the analogous 
Lemma of Cooper and Mello (1991). 
Insert Figure 4 here 
The goal of the bargaining process is to choose a suitable point on the 
curve nn as the final outcome that is acceptable to both the parties. For 
clarity, we have redrawn the payoff space of Figure 4 as Figure 5. In devel-
oping the bargaining game model, we need to describe what happens in case of 
conflict, i.e., when the firms cannot arrive at an agreement on the final 
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outcome. In conflict situation the firms will act on their own in achieving 
their individual objectives. This means that firm A will compare two options: 
(1) arranging independently for a swap with Z as the counterparty to convert 
its fixed rate obligation into a floating rate obligation, or (2) directly 
raise floating fund in the marketplace and liquidate the fixed rate debt. The 
firm A will then naturally choose the better alternative of these two. Thus, 
the firm A's wealth in case of conflict is given by 
WA • Conflict Payoff of Firm A 
With similar arguments we can determine the wealth of B in case of conflict as 
WB • Conflict Payoff of Firm·B 
Referring to Figure 5, we can see that the conflict payoffs, WA and WB, put 
further constraints on the payoff space. The principle of individual ratio-
nality dictates that no firm may agree to a final outcome where the payoff it 
receives is less than the conflict payoff. Hence, we are left with the 
segment pq as the undominated set of payoffs. In determining the final 
payoff, we may only pay attention to this set. 
Insert Figure 5 here 
The line segment pq may also be seen as the Pareto set since it is not 
possible to move from one point to another point on the segment while simulta-
neously improving the wealth of both parties. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947) called this the negotiation set and argued that the entire segment pq 
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should be seen as the cooperative solution to the game. From a practical 
viewpoint, however, one needs to restrict the solution to a single point. 
John Nash (1950, 1953) proposed the first, and arguably the most signifi-
cant, unique solution to a two-person bargaining game. The Nash model is 
based on four postulates that embody certain notions of fairness and reason-
ableness. Based on these postulates of joint efficiency, symmetry, linear 
invariance and independence of irrelevant alternatives, Nash proves the 
existence and the uniqueness of the solution (see Luce and Raiffa (1957) and 
Harsanyi (1977)). 
In our present situation, this solution, w* • (WA, WB), is obtained by 
solving the following maximization problem: 
(P1) 
S.T. W E Negotiation Set 
Another way of defining (P1) follows. Let H(WA,WB) • 0 be the equation 
of segment pq representing the negotiation set. Let HA and HB be the first 
partial derivatives of H with respect to WA and WB. Using the Lagrangian 
multipliers we can see that the maximization problem of (Pl) is equivalent to 
H(WA, WB) • 0 
(P2) 
* - * HA(WA - WA) - HB(WB - WB) 
which give a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution (see 
Harsanyi (1977)). 
* * * Having found the solution W • (WA, WB) that is acceptable to both A and 
B, the next step is to solve for underlying swap rates, ~ and Ft such that 
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and 
Thus, ~ and F~ are the equilibrium swap rates that we expect will be 
agreeable to A, B and Z, when firm A swaps with B through the intermediary z. 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed two type·s of interest rate swap transac-
tions. The first, which is an extension of Cooper and Mello (1991) approach, 
is the swap between a firm and a riskless intermediary where the firm has 
issued floating rate debt and swaps it for fixed rate debt. We characterize 
the equilibrium swap rate in this case. The second, which is more complex and 
therefore more interesting, is the swap between two risky firms arranged 
through an intermediary that guarantees the performance of both parties to 
each other. The equilibrium swap rate in this case depends on the strategic 
interaction between the two firms and the intermediary. Given this strategic 
interdependence, we model this swap as a Nash Bargaining Game and characterize 
the solution to it. 
A swap rate defines the cash flows passing through the intermediary to and 
from the firms. We identify the condition implied by the competitive nature 
of the market for intermediary services. This competitivity condition defines 
the set of feasible swap rates. Each of the feasible swap rates, in turn, 
determine the shareholder wealth levels for both firms. This is the payoff 
space in the firms' bargaining game. The actions available to the firms in 
case of a disagreement as to the final outcome give us the conflict payoffs. 
Given the payoff space and the conflict payoffs we apply the Nash bargaining 
solution procedure to arrive at the equilibrium swap rate. Since the 
equilibrium swap rate is an optimal outcome of the game, any other swap rate 
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would be unacceptable to at least one of the parties. The observed swap 
rates, therefore would be consistent with our model. In addition to being 
descriptive of the prevailing swap rates in the market, our model can be used 
by the intermediaries to quote the rates that are likely to be acceptable to 
the firms, and by the firms to choose the rates best suited for them. 
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Footnotes 
lsee Stigum (1990) for a summary of the workings of swap markets. Also, 
see Arnold (1984). 
2If we allowed for debts to be priced off two different base rates such as 
"T-bill rate" and "LIBOR," then we will need to consider the correlation be-
tween . the two rates. 
3our formal analysis assumes that the existing liabilities could be 
retired with zero cost. The analysis. however, can be easily modified to 
account for non-zero cost. 
4This condition is analogous to equation (4) in Cooper and Mello (1991). 
We restate below their equation (4) in our notation for later reference in our 
paper. 
(3A) -B -B - -B B Fs - Ym - PX(VB, Ym, Fs) • 0 
-B 
where Fs is the value of a default risk free claim on Fs and Ym is the value 
of a default risk free claim on Y:. - -B B PX(YB, Ym, Fs) is the value of a put 
- ~ B option on the maximum of VB and Ym with exercise price equal to Fg. 
Sin cases where one of the parties to the swap is a passive intermediary, 
there is no strategic interdependence and hence there is no necessity of a 
game theoretic approach. Therefore, in our fixed for floating rate swap model 
in section A above, and the floating for fixed rate swap model analyzed by 




In this appendix we examine the conditions on parameter values that ensure 
the convexity of payoff space. Convexity is ensured by the condition, 
d2wA<Y!> < o 
dWB(F!) 2 
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We will analyze each of the three terms in (A-3) above separately. 
Consider the first term in equation (A-3). 
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This implies that the first term in (A-3) is negative. 
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1 ~ > 0 as shown in Stultz (1982) 
131 • Y2 + OB 




But first, we will use the results provided in Stulz (1982) to simplify it to 
the following: 
(A-9) -R B e Fs 
Further simplification yields: 
(A-10) 
Taking the total derivative of this expression yields 
(A-ll) 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that A1 > 0. 






then the second term in equation (A-3) is negative. 
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The terms on the R.H.S. of (A-14) are clearly positive, and (A-13) are clearly 
negative. Thus, using (A-4) and (A-ll) it is clear that the third term in 
equation (A-3) is always negative. The appendix above characterizes the con-
ditions for the convexity of payoff space. 
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Interest Obligations of Firms 
Action 
1. Raise fixed rate debt in market 
2. Raise floating rate debt in market 
3. Raise floating rate in market and 
swap with z·as counterparty for 
fixed rate 
4. Raise fixed rate in market and 
swap with Z as counterparty for 
floating rate 
5. Raise floating rate in market and 
swap through Z as intermediary for 
fixed rate 
6. Raise fixed rate in market and 





~ - A m • R + 6m 
~_A - A 
Tz - R + Sz 
~_A - A 




-B Ym • ii B + 6m 
-B - B Yz - R + 68 
TABLE 3 
Cash Flows to Swap Participants at the Swap Maturity 
State B~ E~ z~ C(VA,~) ~ A CM(VA, z,Fro) ~ A P( Z• Fro) 
A~ VA>Fm> Z FA ro VA-~ -(~-~) VA-~ 0 A~ Fro- Z 
A ~ Fm>VA> Z ~· VA-~ -(~-~) VA-~ 0 A~ Fro- Z 
A~ Fm> z>VA A~ VA+Fro- Z 0 A~ -(Fro- z) 0 0 A -A Fm-Yz 
~ A FA VA-~ ~-~ VA-~ - A 0 VA> z>Fm m Yz-Fm 
~ A FA 0 A 0 A 0 z>VA>Fro m VA-Fm VA-Fm 
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